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Abstract. We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference
lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum
weight. This problem is known to be NP-hard in general. Our contribution is two fold: a polyhedral character-
ization and an approximation algorithm. Previously Chen et al. have shown that the stable matching polytope
is integral if and only if the subgraph obtained after running phase one of Irving’s algorithm is bipartite. We
improve upon this result by showing that there are instances where this subgraph might not be bipartite but one
can further eliminate some edges and arrive at a bipartite subgraph. Our elimination procedure ensures that the
set of stable matchings remains the same, and thus the stable matching polytope of the final subgraph contains
the incidence vectors of all stable matchings of our original graph. This allows us to characterize a larger class
of instances for which the weighted stable matching problem is polynomial-time solvable. We also show that
our edge elimination procedure is best possible, meaning that if the subgraph we arrive at is not bipartite, then
there is no bipartite subgraph that has the same set of stable matchings as the original graph. We complement
these results with a 2-approximation algorithm for the minimum weight stable matching problem for instances
where each agent has at most two possible partners in any stable matching. This is the first approximation result
for any class of instances with general weights.
1 Introduction
An instance of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is a pair (G,≺), where G = (V , E) is a graph and
≺ = {≺v}v∈V is a set of preference lists, where for each v ∈ V , ≺v is a strict linear order on δ(v), the
neighbors of v in G. The vertices of G represent the set of agents and the edges correspond to mutually
acceptable pairs. If an agent v ∈ V has two neighbors u, w in G such that u ≺v w then we say that v prefers
u over w. Let M ⊆ E be a matching of G. For each vertex v ∈ V , we denote M(v) its partner in M, or
let M(v) = v if v is unmatched in M. The edge uv ∈ E is a blocking edge for M if u is unmatched or
prefers v to its current partner and if, at the same time, v is unmatched or prefers u to its current partner.
A matching M is stable if no edge e ∈ E is a blocking edge for M. In the Weighted Stable Matching
Problem (wSMP), in addition to (G,≺), a weight w(e) ≥ 0 is assigned to each edge e ∈ E and we wish
to find a stable matching M of maximum or minimum weight.
When G is bipartite, we obtain the well-studied Stable Marriage Problem first introduced by Gale
and Shapley [9]. In their seminal work, Gale and Shapley showed that every instance of SMP admits a
solution and such a solution can be computed efficiently using the so-called deferred acceptance algo-
rithm. In fact, both SMP and wSMP are solvable in polynomial time. In particular, there exists a system
of linear inequalities, known as the stable matching polytope, that describes the convex hull of the inci-
dence vectors of stable matchings. Since its introduction, the stable marriage problem has become one
of the most popular combinatorial problems with several books being dedicated to its study [10], [13]
and more recently [12]. The popularity of this model arises not only from its nice theoretical properties
but also from its many applications. In particular, a wide array of allocation problems from many di-
verse fields can be analysed within its context. Some well known examples include the labour market
for medical interns, auction markets, the college admissions market and the organ donor-recipient pair
market [13].
If G is non-bipartite we have what is known as the Stable Roommates Problem. This problem was
also proposed by Gale and Shapley [9], however its properties are quite different from the bipartite
case. To begin with, not every instance admits a stable matching. Irving provided a polynomial time
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algorithm that either finds a stable matching or reports that none exist. Unlike in the bipartite case, the
stable matching polytope is no longer integral, and the wSMP problem becomes NP-hard in general.
1.1 Our contribution and results.
We study instances where G is non-bipartite. Our main result is to characterize a new and larger class
of instances for which the wSMP can be solved in polynomial time. We say that an instance (G,≺) is
bipartite reducible if there exists a subgraph H of G such that H is bipartite and has the same set of
stable matchings as G. Our first result is polynomial time edge-elimination procedure that either finds
such a bipartite subgraph or determines that the original instance is not bipartite reducible.
Result 1 There exists a polynomial time algorithm that either finds a bipartite subgraph H of G whose
set of stable matchings is the same as that of G, or determines that no such subgraph exists.
Since the stable matching polytope is integral for bipartite graphs, this implies that we can optimize a
linear function over the set of stable matchings of any bipartite reducible instance. Previously, this was
known only for instances where the subgraph obtained after running phase one of Irving’s algorithm is
bipartite. We show that our result is a strict generalization.
Result 2 wSMP is polynomially solvable for all instances (G,≺) that are bipartite reducible. Moreover,
the class of bipartite reducible instances is a strict superset of the class of instances for which phase one
of Irving’s produces a bipartite graph.
We then consider approximation algorithms for the minimum weight stable matching problem. Previous
research on this topic has focused on special classes of weight functions such as the egalitarian stable
matching and U-shaped weights. However, no approximation algorithm was previously known for any
class of instances under general weights. We provide a first result of this kind by considering instances
where each agent is matched to one of two possible partners in any stable matchings.
Result 3 There exists a 2-approximation algorithm for the minimum-weight stable matching problem
for instances where each agent has at most two possible partners in any stable matching.
1.2 Related work.
Gale and Shapley [8] showed that a stable matching always exists if G is bipartite, and gave a polynomial
time algorithm known as the deferred acceptance algorithm for finding such a matching. They also
observed that if G is non-bipartite, a stable matching does not always exist. Irving [11] gave the first
polynomial-time algorithm that either finds a stable matching when G is non-bipartite, or determines
that no such matching exists. His algorithm was originally for instances where the underlying graph G
is the complete graph, however it can be easily generalized for any graph G.
Vande Vate [16] first characterized incidence vectors of perfect stable matchings as vertices of a cer-
tain polytope in the case when G is a complete bipartite graph, thus showing that wSMP is polynomial-
time solvable in this case. Later, Rothblum [14] extended this result to general bipartite graphs.
Feder [7] showed that wSMP is NP-hard in general. A particular case of weight function is the
egalitarian weight function, where for each edge e = uv its weight w(e) is given by the sum of
ranks of this particular edge in its endpoints’ preference lists. Feder [7],[6] gave a 2-approximation
for finding a minimum-weight stable matching with egalitarian weights and showed that there exists
an α-approximation for minimum-weight SMP if and only if there exists an α-approximation for the
Minimum Vertex Cover. Later, it was showed that, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, Minimum
Vertex Cover cannot be approximated within 2 −  for any  > 0 [2].
Teo and Sethuraman [15] constructed a 2-aproximation algorithm for the minimum-weight SMP for
a larger class of weight functions than the egalitarian weight functions, namely weight functions where
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w(uv) = wu(v) +wv(u) for each uv ∈ E, and the functions {wu} satisfy the so-called U-shape condition.
Recently, Cseh et al. [4] considered a class of minimum-weight SMP problems with egalitarian weights
where all preference lists are of length at most d. For d = 2, they gave a polynomial time algorithm
for solving this problem while they showed that it is NP-hard even for d = 3. Moreover, for d ∈
{3, 4, 5}, they gave a 2d+37 -approximation algorithm for minimum-weight SMP with egalitarian weights,
improving the results of Feder.
2 Preliminaries
Let (G,≺) be an instance of SMP. If e = uv and f = wv are two edges in E with u ≺v w, we can write
this equivalently as e ≺v f , and we say that e dominates f at v. For each e ∈ E, let φ(e) be the set
containing e and all the edges that dominate e at one of the endpoints. That is,
φ(e) = { f ∈ E : ∃ v ∈ V : f ≺v e} ∪ {e}
Note that under this definition, a matching is stable if and only if |M ∩ φ(e)| ≥ 1 for each e ∈ E. For
each u, v s.t. uv ∈ E, we let ranku(v) be the rank of v in u’s preference list. We say that a matching M is
perfect if every agent is matched in M; that is M(v) , v, for all v ∈ V . For each subgraph K of G, we let
≺K be the restriction of ≺ to K. For simplicity, we will denote the SMP instance (K,≺K) by (K,≺). For
each v ∈ V , we denote the most and least preferred partner of v in K by fK(v) and lK(v), respectively.
We denote E(K) the set of edges of K and V(K) the set of vertices of K.
Definition 1 (Stable matching polytope). For an instance (G,≺) of SMP, we let the Stable matching
polytope S M(G,≺) be the convex hull of incidence vectors of its stable matchings.
If x = χM is an incidence vector of a stable matching M, it satisfies the following inequalities:
(i) matching:
x(δ(v)) ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V (1)
(ii) stability:
x(φ(e)) ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ E (2)
(iii) non-negativity:
x ≥ 0 (3)
Definition 2 (Fractional stable matching polytope). For an instance (G,≺) of SMP the Fractional
stable matching polytope is given by
FS M(G,≺) =
x ∈ RE :
x(δ(v)) ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V
x(φ(e)) ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ E
x ≥ 0
 , (4)
The Fractional stable matching polytope was first studied by Abeledo and Rothblum [1], who proved
that the incidence vectors of stable matchings are precisely the integral vertices of FS M(G,≺). They
also showed that this polytope is integral if G is bipartite, and that all the vertices of FS M(G,≺) are
half-integral in general, meaning that xe ∈
{
0, 12 , 1
}
for each e ∈ E for each vertex x.
Irving [11] gave a two-phase polynomial-time algorithm for finding a stable matching of an instance
(G,≺) or determining that no such matching exists. Phase one of this algorithm consists of a proposal
sequence that results in a unique subgraph of G that has the same set of stable matchings as (G,≺).
Definition 3 (Irving’s phase one). For an instance (G,≺) of SMP let GI be the subgraph of G obtained
by applying phase one of Irving’s algorithm to (G,≺).
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Chen et al. [3] show that FS M(G,≺) is integral if and only if the graph GI is bipartite. Note that, for
bipartite graphs G, the integrality of FS M(G,≺) follows easily from this result.
Theorem 1 (Chen [3]). The following are equivalent.
1. FS M(G,≺) is integral.
2. GI is a bipartite graph.
We will use the following well known property of stable matchings, which says that whenever an
edge is in the support of some fractional stable matching then the corresponding stability constraint for
this edge is satisfied with equality.
Lemma 1 (Abeledo, Rothblum [1]). Let x ∈ FS M(G,≺). Then for any e ∈ E,
xe > 0 ⇒ x(φ(e)) = 1. (5)
In the same paper, Albedo and Rothblum show that the set of matched vertices is the same for every
stable matching M of (G,≺).
Lemma 2 (Abeledo and Rothblum [1]). Given (G,≺), the vertex set V can be partitioned into two sets
V0 and V1 such that
V0 = {v ∈ V : v is not matched in any stable matching M of (G,≺)}
V1 = {v ∈ V : v is matched in every stable matching M of (G,≺)}.
Moreover, for each j = 0, 1 and v ∈ V j, it holds that x(δ(v)) = j, ∀ x ∈ FS M(G,≺).
For our purposes, it will be easier to work with instance where stable matchings are perfect, meaning
that V0 = ∅. We show that we can focus on such instances without any loss of generality. First, we can
use Irving’s algorithm to decide if stable matchings exists, and if so, find the bipartition of the agents
into V0 and V1 as in Lemma 2. Now, consider the subgraph G[V1] of G. Clearly, any stable matching of
G is a stable matching of G[V1]. Moreover, a stable matching of G[V1] will be a stable matching of G as
long as none of the edges with an endpoint in V0 are blocking, meaning that any vertex u which has a
neighbor w ∈ V0 is matched to someone they prefer over w. We thus obtain the following observation.
Theorem 2 (Reducing to the perfect stable matching case). Given (G,≺), let V0 and V1 be as in
Lemma 2. Let
E1 =
uv ∈ E :
u, v ∈ V1
∀w ∈ V0, uw < E or v ≺u w
∀w ∈ V0, vw < E or u ≺v w

and G1 = (V1, E1). Then M is a stable matching of (G,≺) if and only if it is a perfect stable matching
of (G1,≺).
Observe that, by Lemma 2, if an instance (G,≺) has a perfect stable matching, then all stable matchings
of (G,≺) are perfect. Thus, from now on, we consider without loss of generality only instances which
have at least one stable matching, and all the stable matchings are perfect.
In our analysis we will rely on a useful characterization of the vertices of FS M(G,≺) introduced by
Chen et al. [3]. This characterization is based on the notion of semi-stable partitions, which we define
below. A cycle C = v0v1 · · · vk−1v0 of G is said to have a cyclic preference if vi−1 ≺vi vi+1 for all
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 or vi+1 ≺vi vi−1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, where all indices are taken modulo k.
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Definition 4 (Semi-stable partitions.). Given (G,≺) let C = {C1, . . . , Ck} be a set where
– each Ci is an edge of G or a cycle in G with cyclic preferences in (G,≺),
– each vertex v ∈ V is contained in precisely one Ci,
and let xC ∈ RE be defined as
(xC)e =

1 if e is an edge in C
1
2 if e is a part of a cycle C in C
0 otherwise
Then C is a semi-stable partition if xC ∈ (G,≺).
In other words, for C to be a semi-stable partition, Cmust be a collection of edges and cycles with cyclic
preferences, such that the point x assigning value 1 to the single edges and 12 to the edges on the cycles
is a feasible point of FS M(G,≺). Chen et al. [3] show that if x is a vertex of FS M(G,≺), then x = xC
for some semi-stable partition C .
3 Identifying redundant edges
Chen et al. [3] prove that the instances (G,≺), for which the polytope FS M(G,≺) is integral, are pre-
cisely those, for which the graph GI obtained from phase one of Irving’s algorithm is bipartite. Thus, the
polytope FS M(G,≺) can be used to solve the weighted stable matching problem only for this class of
instances. The edges deleted in phase one are, in a sense, redundant for the instance. By this we mean
that none of these edges appear in any stable matching of G, and also by deleting them, the set of stable
matchings of the instance stays unchanged, i.e. (G,≺) and (GI ,≺) have the same set of stable matchings.
However, it could still be the case that GI contains edges that never appear in any stable matching of
(G,≺). This suggests the one could improve upon phase one of Irving’s algorithm by further searching
for edges that never appear in a stable matching and whose removal preserves the set of stable matchings.
In general, when removing an edge e from a graph G that is never a part of a stable matching, the set
of stable matchings either stays the same, or gets larger. All the original stable matchings of (G,≺) are
still stable matchings of (G \ e,≺); however, it can happen that a matching M′ is stable in (G \ e,≺), but
is not stable in (G,≺), because e is a blocking edge for M′ in (G,≺). Thus our goal is to identify edges
e that are not in any stable matching, and whose removal does not introduce any extra stable matchings.
As a motivation for this approach, consider the following example.
Example 1. Let the preferences be as follows, where each line v|v1 . . . vk means v1 ≺v . . . ≺v vk
1 3 4 5 2
2 1 4 3 5 6
3 5 6 1 2
4 5 6 1 2
5 1 2 3 4
6 2 3 4
During phase one, only edges 12, 23 and 45 get eliminated. Figure 1 depicts the original graph G on the
left and the graph GI in the middle. The red numbers represent the ranks of the edges by their respective
endpoints. It is easy to check that FS M(G,≺) = conv{x, y}, where
xe =
1 e ∈ {14, 25, 36}0 otherwise and ye =
 12 e ∈ {13, 35, 15, 24, 46, 26}0 otherwise
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Fig. 1: The graphs G, GI and H from Example 1.
The edge 12 is never a part of any stable matching, and, at the same time, the worst (remaining) option for
agent 1. By removing this edge we don’t introduce any new stable matchings, since any stable matching
M in (G \ {12},≺) is perfect, and 1 has a strictly better partner in M than 2, thus M is stable in (G,≺),
too. By repeating the above argument, we can keep reducing our graph by eliminating edges 12, 26, 32,
42, 54, 64, 15, 31 and 53 in turn, while always preserving the same set of stable matchings. The resulting
graph H consists of precisely the three edges 14, 25, 36 that form a stable matching - the only stable
matching of the original instance (G,≺).
This example illustrates that there are cases where even though GI is not bipartite and FS M(G,≺) is
not integral, one can still identify redundant edges in order to arrive at a bipartite subgraph, whose set of
stable matchings is the same as the original instance meaning that wS MP can be solved in polynomial
time. Our goal is to develop a polynomial-time algorithm that finds such a subgraph whenever it exists.
We start by showing that it is possible to identify the set of edges that appear in a stable matching of
(G,≺) in polynomial time using Irving’s algorithm.
Definition 5. Given (G,≺), let
EM = {e ∈ E : ∃ stable matching M s.t. e ∈ M}
be the set of edges of G that ever appear in a stable matching of G. Further, let H = (V , EM) be the
graph consisting only of the edges in EM.
The graph H is a subgraph of the graph GI , and it shares the following useful property with GI .
Lemma 3. Let (G,≺) be given and uv ∈ EM. Then u = fH(v)⇔ v = lH(u).
We remark however, that while (GI ,≺) keeps the same stable matchings as (G,≺), the set of stable
matchings of (H,≺) can be a strict superset of the set of stable matchings of (G,≺).
The following lemma shows that we can decide in polynomial time whether a given edge e ∈ E
belongs to the set EM.
Lemma 4. Given an instance (G,≺) and an edge uv ∈ G, there exists a stable matching containing uv
if, and only if, (G′ = (V ′, E′),≺) contains a stable matching, where
V ′ = V \ {u, v}
Eu = {wy ∈ G[V ′] : uw ∈ E, w ≺u v, u ≺w y}
Ev = {wy ∈ G[V ′] : vw ∈ E, w ≺v u, v ≺w y}
E′ = E(G[V ′]) \ Eu \ Ev.
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In particular, this implies that the set of edges that are part of a stable matching can be identified in
polynomial time. 1
As already mentioned, by removing an edge e ∈ E \ EM from a graph G, we can introduce new
stable matchings. The following lemma tells us that we can check whether this is the case or not.
Lemma 5. Given (G,≺), let EM be defined as above and let e ∈ E \ EM. Then it can be checked
in polynomial time whether the set of stable matchings of (G,≺) and the set of stable matchings of
(G \ e,≺) are the same.
To see why Lemma 5 is true, observe that for a matching M′ to be stable in (G \ {uv},≺), but not
in (G,≺),both u and v must prefer each other over their respective partners in M′. For each such an
assignment of partners for u and v, we can check whether it can be extended to a perfect stable matching
in (G \ {uv},≺) as in [5].
Note in particular, that if an edge e is the worst choice for one of its endpoints, then it can never be
blocking for any perfect matching. If in addition e ∈ E \ EM then removing it keeps the set of stable
matchings the same. We thus have the following lemma, whose proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 6. Let (G,≺) be given and let an edge e = uv ∈ E \ EM be such that u = lG(v). Then (G,≺)
and (G \ e,≺) have the same set of stable matchings.
The proofs of all the lemmas in this section are deferred to the Appendix.
3.1 Algorithm
Instead of applying phase one of Irving’s algorithm to a given instance (G,≺), we will now use Lemma
6 to keep identifying and removing edges from the graph while preserving the set of stable matchings.
Algorithm 1. Given (G,≺),
1. Identify the set EM of edges contained in stable matchings of (G,≺).
2. While possible:
(i) Identify an edge e ∈ E(G) such that
◦ e < EM, and
◦ e is the worst remaining option for one of its endpoints.
(ii) Remove e from G: set G ← G \ e.
3. Return G.
Definition 6. Given (G,≺), let H be the graph obtained from G by applying the Algorithm 1 to it.
Denote EH the set of its edges.
First thing to observe is that the graph we obtain from the Algorithm 1 is independent of the order of
deletion of the edges. In other words, H is well-defined.
Lemma 7. The graph H is well-defined.
The main idea behind the proof of Lemma 7 is that once an edge e can be removed from G in Algorithm
1, it can also be removed from any graph G′ otained from G by a sequence of edge removals as in
Algorithm 1. Thus e will be removed from G no matter what the order of deletion of the edges is. The
full proof of Lemma 7 can be found in the Appendix.
1 A more general version of the problem of deciding whether a given set of edges is contained in a stable matching was
considered by Dias et al [5].
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We now enumerate several properties of H. The proof is found in the Appendix.
Theorem 3. Given (G,≺), let EM and H. Then
(i) EM ⊆ H.
(ii) (G,≺) and (H,≺) have the same set of stable matchings.
(iii) H is a subgraph of GI .
(iv) H = HI , where HI is obtained from H by applying phase one to (H,≺).
(v) Let uv ∈ EH . Then u = fH(v)⇔ v = lH(u).
(vi) Let v ∈ V. Then v fH(v) ∈ EM.
(vii) Let uv ∈ EH \ EM. Then fH(v) ≺v u ≺v lH(v) and fH(u) ≺u v ≺u lH(u).
Note in particular that, for each agent, his worst and best remaining options are in EM. That means
that, in the algorithm, we were deleting edges that were worse than edges in EM for one of the endpoints,
but by doing this, all the edges that were better for one of the endpoints than edges in EM got removed
as well.
Since (G,≺) and (H,≺) have the same set of stable matchings by construction of H, the polytopes
FS M(G,≺) and FS M(H,≺) have exactly the same set of integral vertices. Moreover, if H is bipartite,
then Theorem 1 implies that FS M(H,≺) is integral. In general, it can happen that FS M(G,≺) is not
integral, but FS M(H,≺) is, which happens precisely when GI is not bipartite, but H is. If this is the case,
then there exists at least one semi-stable partition C such that xC is a fractional vertex of FS M(G,≺), and
supp(x) * EH . Moreover, no semi-stable partition C corresponding to fractional vertex of FS M(G,≺)
satisfies E(C) ⊆ EH .
4 Characterizing bipartite reducible graphs
In the Algorithm 1, we removed some edges such that their deletion didn’t affect the set of stable match-
ings. However, it is not guaranteed that this deletion couldn’t continue further, or that some other method
of eliminating edges from G to obtain a smaller subgraph of G with the same set of stable matching
wouldn’t yield a graph K whose polytope FS M(K,≺) is integral.
In this section, we will show that if some order of deletion would yield such a K, or, in fact, if any
other method of obtaining such a K worked, then H would be bipartite and the corresponding polytope
would be integral. Our goal is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let (G,≺) be given. Then if H is not bipartite, then neither is any subgraph K of G with
the property that (K,≺) and (G,≺) have the same set of stable matchings. In other words, H is bipartite
if and only if (G,≺) is bipartite reducible.
4.1 Modifying the FSM polytope
We start by having a closer look at the fractional stable matching polytope FS M(G,≺). It is easy to see
that each edge e ∈ E \ E(GI) satisfies xe = 0 for all points x ∈ FS M(G,≺), but it is in general not true
that e < EM ⇒ xe = 0, ∀x ∈ FS M(G,≺). Thus we start by adding the constraint xe = 0 for each edge
e ∈ E \ EM to FS M(G,≺).
Definition 7. Given a system (G,≺) with EM as above, let
FS M′(G,≺) =
x ∈ R
E :
xe = 0 ∀e ∈ E \ EM
x(δ(v) ∩ EM) ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V
x(φ(e) ∩ EM) ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ E
x ≥ 0
 .
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FS M(G,≺) =
x ∈ REM :
x(δ(v) ∩ EM) ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V
x(φ(e) ∩ EM) ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ E
x ≥ 0
 .
We observe that FS M′(G,≺) is the intersection of FS M(G,≺) with some of its facets - namely
the facets {xe = 0}e∈E\EM . Further, FS M(G,≺) is just a restriction of FS M′(G,≺) to the edges in EM,
where we drop coordinates in E \ EM, which satisfy xe = 0 ∀x ∈ FS M′(G,≺). Thus, the following
holds:
Remark 1. For an arbitrary instance (G,≺),
– each vertex of FS M′(G,≺) is also a vertex of FS M(G,≺),
– all vertices of FS M′(G,≺) are half-integral,
– the integral vertices of FS M′(G,≺) are precisely the integral vertices of FS M(G,≺),
– there is a 1-to-1 correspondence between the vertices of FS M(G,≺) and those of FS M′(G,≺).
Each vertex of FS M(G,≺) is a vertex of FS M′(G,≺) projected to EM.
Following these remarks, we can observe that the integral vertices of FS M(G,≺) correspond to stable
matchings of (G,≺). Moreover, it can be the case that by intersecting the polytope FS M(G,≺) with its
facets {xe = 0} for all e ∈ E \ EM we cut off all its fractional vertices, and the polytope FS M(G,≺) is
integral.
Let us revisit Lemma 6 from the previous section in the light of the polytope FS M(G,≺). We defer
the proof to the Appendix.
Lemma 8. Let (G,≺) be given and let an edge e = uv ∈ E \ EM be such that u = lG(v). Then
(i) (G,≺) and (G \ e,≺) have the same set of stable matchings.
(ii) FS M(G,≺) = FS M(G \ e,≺). In other words, the inequality x(φ(e) ∩ EM) ≥ 1 is redundant in
FS M(G,≺).
Note that the removal of an edge that is the worst remaining choice for one of its endpoints does not
change the polytope FS M(G,≺). This leads us to the following result.
Corollary 1. For any (G,≺), we have that FS M(G,≺) = FS M(H,≺).
4.2 Conditions for integrality of FSM(G,≺)
We now give sufficient and necessary conditions for integrality of FS M(G,≺). For the rest of this
section, we will consider semi-stable partitions with respect to the polytope FS M(G,≺) (note that in
Definition 4 they were defined with respect to FS M(G,≺)). Analogously to our original definition, we
will say that C is a semi-stable partition w.r.t FS M(G,≺), if and only if C is a collection of vertex-
disjoint edges and cycles with cyclic preferences in EM, such that the point xC assigning value 1 to the
single edges and 12 to the edges on the cycles is a feasible point of FS M(G,≺).
We let E(C) be the edges in C, and we use the notation of Chen et al. [3] to define the set of edges
EC = {uv ∈ EH : ∃ e1, e2, f1, f2 ∈ E(C) : e1 u uv u e2 and f1 v uv v f2}.
Observe that EC consists of all edges in C and of all so-called intermediate edges, which are edges with
both endpoints on a cycles from C that fit in between the edges in C in both endpoint’s preference lists.
We then let HC be the subgraph of H induced by the edges EC.
The following lemma, whose proof is in the Appendix, characterizes the vertices of FS M(G,≺).
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Lemma 9. Let x be a vertex of FS M(G,≺). Then x = xC for some semi-stable partition C w.r.t.
FS M(G,≺).
With this, we obtain the following equivalent conditions for the integrality of FS M(G,≺).
Theorem 5. The following are equivalent.
1. FS M(G,≺) is integral,
2. H is bipartite,
3. HC is bipartite for any semi-stable partition C w.r.t. FS M(G,≺).
Moreover, if x is a vertex of FS M(G,≺), then x is half-integral.
We note that both Lemma 9 and Theorem 5 are analogous to the results proven by Chen et al. [3] for
FS M(G,≺).
Note that, in particular, if HC is not bipartite for some semi-stable partition C w.r.t FS M(G,≺), then
FS M(G,≺) is not integral. On the other hand, if FS M(G,≺) is integral, then all the graphs HC have
the same bipartition, namely the bipartition of H. To make the proof more readable, we will refer to
semi-stable partitions w.r.t. FS M(G,≺), simply as semi-stable partitions.
Proof of Theorem 5.
(2) ⇒ (1). If H is bipartite, then FS M(H,≺) is integral, and so is FS M(H,≺), by Remark 1. By
Corollary 1, FS M(G,≺) = FS M(H,≺).
(3) ⇒ (2). To see this, note that the set F = {v fH(v) : v ∈ V} of all the edges most preferred in H
by one of its endpoints is a semi-stable partition. Moreover, HF = H.
(1) ⇒ (3). Assume FS M(G,≺) is integral. By Lemma 9, FS M(G,≺) is integral if and only if for
each semi-stable partition C, xC is a convex combination of integral points in FS M(G,≺).
Fix a semi-stable partition C. Then we can write xC = ∑ki=1 λiyi, where k ≥ 1, λi > 0, ∑ki=1 λi = 1
and yi’s are all integral points in FS M(G,≺). For each i ∈ [k], denote by Mi the perfect stable matching
consisting of edges in supp(yi). For simplicity, we will denote xC by x.
If k = 1, then x = y1, thus C is a matching. Then E(HC) = C, and HC is bipartite. Hence we can
assume k ≥ 2. Let {ei = uivi}i∈[m] be the set of single edges in C, and let W = V \ {ui, vi}i∈[m] be the
vertices on cycles in C.
For each i ∈ [k] we have xe = 0 ⇒ yie = 0 and xe = 1 ⇒ yie = 1, so in particular supp(yi) ⊆
supp(x). Since for each i ∈ [k], Mi must be a perfect matching whose edges are a subset of E(C), we
immediately have that all the cycles in C must be even.
Further note that each v ∈ W is matched to one of only two possible u’s in any of the Mi’s, namely
to one of its two neighbors on the cycle in C it is a part of. Let denote these two partners v+ and v−,
where v+ ≺v v−. Then let W1 = {v ∈ W : vv+ ∈ M1} be the set of agents that are matched to their more
preferred neighbor in M1. Let W2 = W \W1.
Claim: (W1 ∪ {ui}, W2 ∪ {vi}) is a bipartition of HC.
Proof: Note that u = v+ ⇔ v = u− and, in particular, the only edges of HC that could lie in W1 ×W1
or in W2 ×W2 are those in E(HC) \ E(C). Further, for each uv in E(HC) \ E(C), (φ(uv) ∩ supp(x)) =
{uu+, vv+}.
If there was an edge uv ∈ W2 ×W2, then y1(φ(uv)) = 0 since neither uu+ nor vv+ gets value 1 in
y1, so the stability condition at uv would be violated.
Finally, suppose there was an edge uv ∈ W1 ×W1. Let z = ∑ki=2 λi(1−λ1)yi. Then z ∈ FS M(G,≺) and
x = λ1y1 + (1 − λ1)z. Thus z = 11−λ1 (x − λ1y) and
z(φ(uv)) =
1
1 − λ1 ((xuu+ − λ1yuu+) + (xvv+ − λ1yvv+)) =
2( 12 − λ1)
1 − λ1 =
1 − 2λ1
1 − λ1 < 1.
This finishes the proof of the claim and of the theorem. uunionsq
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4.3 Proof of Theorem 4
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose that K is a bipartite subgraph of G such that (G,≺) and (K,≺) have
the same set of stable matchings. Let K′ be the graph obtained from K by applying Algorithm 1 to it.
Since K′ is bipartite, by Theorem 5 applied to K, FS M(K,≺) is integral, and so is FS M(K′,≺) by
Corollary 1.
Since in K′, for each agent we have that its best and worst remaining edge must be in EM, K′
contains no edges in E \ EH , thus E(K′) ⊆ EH . But then all the inequalities from FS M(K′,≺) are in
FS M(H,≺), meaning that FS M(K′,≺) ⊇ FS M(H,≺). Further, (H,≺) and (K′,≺) have the same set
of stable matchings, so the integral vertices of FS M(H,≺) are the integral vertices of FS M(K′,≺) and
vice versa. Hence FS M(H,≺) is integral.
By Corollary 1 and Theorem 5, H is bipartite. uunionsq
5 Approximation algorithm
In this section, we study instances where each agent has at most two possible partners in any stable
matching, meaning that H consists only of single edges and disjoint cycles with cyclic preferences.
Note that even in these instances H being bipartite is not enough to ensure that FS M(G,≺) is integral.
However, we show that we can obtain a 2-approximation algorithm for the minimum-weight stable
matching in this case.
Theorem 6. Suppose (G,≺) is such that H consists only of single edges and vertex-disjoint cycles.
Then, for any weight function w : E → R≥0, we can find, in polynomial time, a stable matching M?
such that w(M?) ≤ 2w(MOPT ), where MOPT is a stable matching of (G,≺) of minimum weight.
Proof. Suppose that H consists of vertex-disjoint cycles C1, . . . , Ck and single edges e1, . . . , em. Then,
by definition of H, these cycles must all have even length (otherwise it would not be true that each edge
in H is a part of a stable matching) and also that the preferences on the cycles are cyclic (following from
Theorem 3).
Let M be a stable matching of (G,≺). Then ei ∈ M ∀i ∈ [m] and also |Ck ∩ M| = 12 |Ck|, ∀i ∈ [k].
Hence, for any cycle Ci = v1i , . . . , v
2ri
i we have either that {v2 ji v2 j+1i } j∈[ri] ⊆ M or {v2 j−1i v2 ji } j∈[ri] ⊆ M.
For each i ∈ [k] let
w+i =
∑
j∈[ri]
w(v2 j−1i v
2 j
i ) and w
−
i =
∑
j∈[ri]
w(v2 ji v
2 j+1
i )
and suppose without loss of generality that w+i ≥ w−i .
We construct a weight function w˜ as follows: For each i ∈ [k] we set w˜(v1i v2i ) = w+i − w−i and we
set the weights of all the other edges to zero. Intuitively, for each stable matching M and for each cycle
Ci we must pick half of the edges of Ci to be in M, and there are only two ways of doing it. Hence
the individual weights of the edges on the cycles do not play any role. In the new weight function we
construct, all edges have weight 0, apart from one on each cycle Ci whose weight we set to the difference
between w+i and w
−
i .
Then, for any stable matching M of (G,≺), we have that
w(M) = w˜(M) +W−,
where
W− =
∑
i∈[k]
w−i +
∑
i∈[m]
w(ei).
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In particular, M is optimal for w˜ if and only if it is optimal for w.
Now, ovserve that for each agent v ∈ V , at most one of its neighboring edges has non-zero weight in
w˜, and this edge would have to be either the most or the least preferred by V in H. This implies that the
weight function w˜ has the so-called U-shaped property of Teo and Sethuraman [15]. Thus we can find,
in polynomial time, a stable matching M? such that
w˜(M?) ≤ 2w˜(MOPT )
meaning that
w(M?) −W− ≤ 2(w(MOPT ) −W−)
and so in fact
w(M?) ≤ 2w(MOPT ) −W− ≤ 2w(MOPT ).
uunionsq
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. (⇒): Suppose that u = fH(v). If there was any partner w for u such that uw ∈ EM
and v ≺u w, then in a (perfect) stable matching M containing uw, v would have a different partner than
u, in particular u ≺v M(v) and the edge uv would be blocking. Hence v = lH(u).
(⇐): Every agent w is the most preferred in H by precisely one agent, as otherwise there would be
two agents x, y such that w = fH(x) = fH(y), implying x = lH(w) = y. For each agent w, denote by
w− the unique agent for which w = fH(w
−). Then, for each w, lH(w) = w
− by the above implication.
In particular, for every agent w we have x = lH(w)⇔ x = w− ⇔ w = fH(x). uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 4. Let (G,≺) and e = uv be given. There exists a stable matching M of (G,≺) s.t.
uv ∈ M if and only if there exists a perfect stable matching M′ of (G[V ′],≺) not containing any of the
edges of G[V ′] which would make the matching M′ ∪ {e} blocking in G.
If M′ is a matching in G[V ′] containing an edge wy such that uw ∈ E, w ≺u v, and u ≺w y, then
the edge uw is blocking for the matching M′ ∪ {uv}. Thus any matching M′ for which the matching
M′ ∪ {uv} is stable in (G,≺) excludes all edges in Eu ∪ Ev. On the other hand, any perfect matching M′
that is stable in (G′,≺) is stable in (G[V ′],≺), since none of the edges in Eu ∪ Ev is blocking for M′ in
(G′,≺).
Thus e appears in a stable matching of (G,≺) if and only if there exists a perfect stable matching
in (G′,≺). G′ can be constructed in polynomial time and it can be decided whether (G′,≺) contains a
perfect stable matching using Irving’s algorithm in polynomial time. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose we want to check whether an edge e = uv ∈ E \ EM can be removed
without affecting the set of stable matchings. Let ψu(e) = { f ∈ E : e ≺u f } and ψv(e) = { f ∈ E : e ≺v f }
be the sets of edges strictly dominated by the edge e at the endpoints u and v, respectively.
Then a matching M is stable in (G \ e,≺), but not in (G,≺) if and only if M is a (perfect) stable
matching of (G \ e,≺) such that |M ∩ ψv(e)| = |M ∩ ψu(e)| = 1.
Since |ψu(e)|, |ψv(e)| ≤ n, we have to check at most O(n2) combinations of edges, checking for each
pair ( f ′, f ′′) ∈ ψu(e) × ψv(e) whether it can be extended to a perfect stable matching M of (G \ e,≺).
For each such a pair, the check can be carried in polynomial time [5]. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 6. If there was a matching M′ that was stable in (G \ e,≺), but not stable in (G,≺),
then e would be the only edge blocking M′. Since u = lG(v) and all stable matchings of (G,≺) and
(G \ e,≺) are perfect, we must have M′(v) ≺v u, a contradiction. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose for contradiction that two executions of the algorithm, T1 and T2, yield
two different graphs H1 and H2, respectively. Suppose that e ∈ E(H1) \ E(H2) is an edge present in H1
that is not in H2. Denote E0 the set of edges that got deleted in T2, prior to the deletion of e. Without loss
of generality suppose that E0 ∩ E(H1) = ∅, so in other words, all the edges that were deleted in T2 prior
to e were deleted in T1 too. Then, since in G0 = G[E \ E0], we removed e as the next edge in the T2, e
is the worst remaining option for one of it’s endpoints in G0. Then e is also the worst remaining option
for one of its endpoints in H1 as E(H1) ⊂ (E \ E0) and so e can be deleted from H1, a contradiction. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 3.
(i) This is clear as edges in EM never get removed from the graph. Since each removal preserves the
set of stable matchings, EM does not change as the algorithm goes on.
(ii) Similarly, the edges are eliminated so that the set of stable matchings stays unchanged.
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(iii) Edges removed in phase one of Irving’s algorithm are not in EM. The set of edges removed in
phase one is EI = {uv ∈ E : lGI (u) ≺u v}, i.e. these are precisely those edges that are worse for one
of the endpoints then its worst remaining choice in the resulting graph GI . Consequently, each of
the edges in EI at some point becomes an edge as in Lemma 6 in the current remaining subgraph
of G. Thus all the edges that get eliminated in phase one get also eliminated during our procedure.
Hence H ⊆ GI .
(iv) If this was not true than phase one applied to H would eliminate at least one edge. There would be
at least one eliminated edge that was the worst remaining choice for one of its endpoints.
(v) This is a property of any graph after applying phase one of Irving’s algorithm to it.
(vi) Since v fH(v) = fH(v)lH( fH(v)), if it was not in EM, it would get eliminated.
(vii) An edge in EH \ EM must be neither the last, thus nor the best remaining option for both of its
endpoints.
uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 8. We have already proved part (i) as Lemma 6. For part (ii), it is enough to show
that (φ(e) ∩ EM) ⊇ (φ( f ) ∩ EM) for some edge f ∈ G \ e. Since u is v’s worst remaining choice, we
have that (δ(v) ∩ EM) ⊆ (φ(e) ∩ EM). In other words, all edges in EM adjacent to v are contained in
φ(e) ∩ EM.
Let w be such that w = lH(v) and let f = wv. Note that such an f must exists and also that f , e.
Since w = lH(v), by Lemma 3 we have that v = fH(w) and thus (φ( f ) ∩ EM) = (δ(v) ∩ EM). Hence
(φ( f ) ∩ EM) ⊆ (φ(e) ∩ EM) and the inequality x(φ(e) ∩ EM) ≥ 1 is dominated by the inequality
x(φ( f ) ∩ EM) ≥ 1. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 9. By Remark 1, all the vertices of FS M(G,≺) are projections of the vertices of
FS M(G,≺). By Theorem 1 and by the matching inequality (1), which is satisfied with equality by each
v ∈ V by Lemma 2, we see that, for each v ∈ V , we have either that precisely one of its adjacent edges
has value 1 and all the others zero, or precisely two of its adjacent edges have value 12 and all the others
have value zero. This immediately gives us that supp(x) consists of single edges and vertex-disjoint
cycles.
Suppose that C is such a a cycle and w.l.o.g suppose C = {v1, . . . , vm}. Then, since the stability
inequality (2) must be satisfied at the edge v1v2 and also by Lemma 1, we have that precisely one of
the edges v2v3 and v1vm dominates v1v2 and one is dominated by it. Say, w.l.o.g., that v3 ≺v2 v1 and
v2 ≺v1 vm. Then, since v3 ≺v2 v1, Lemma 1 applied to edge v2v3 implies that v4 ≺v3 v2. Inductively, we
see that vi+1 ≺vi vi−1 for all i = 1, . . . , m. uunionsq
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